Recent Developments: Towson University v. Conte: A Jury\u27s Role in a Wrongful Discharge Case Does Not Include That of Ultimate Fact-Finder by Bayton, Kimmeria
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 35
Number 2 Spring 2005 Article 15
2005
Recent Developments: Towson University v.
Conte: A Jury's Role in a Wrongful Discharge Case
Does Not Include That of Ultimate Fact-Finder
Kimmeria Bayton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bayton, Kimmeria (2005) "Recent Developments: Towson University v. Conte: A Jury's Role in a Wrongful Discharge Case Does Not
Include That of Ultimate Fact-Finder," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 35 : No. 2 , Article 15.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol35/iss2/15
Recent Developments 
TOWSON UNIVERSITY v. CONTE: 
A Jury's Role in a Wrongful Discharge Case Does Not Include 
that of Ultimate Fact-Finder 
By: Kimmeria Bayton 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a jury's role in a 
wrongful discharge case does not include that of ultimate fact-finder. 
Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 862 A.2d 941 (2004). 
Additionally, the court held that in a just cause employment context, a 
jury's role is to determine the objective reasonableness of the 
employer's decision to discharge. Id. 
In 1996, Towson University ("University") hired Dr. Michael 
Conte ("Dr. Conte") as the director of the Regional Economic Studies 
Institute at the University ("RESI"). At the time of his hire, Dr. Conte 
signed an employment contract that detailed his duties as director, 
including his compensation, period of employment and the causes for 
which he could be terminated. 
In 1998, several events occurred that led to the University's 
decision to terminate Dr. Conte. The majority of these events 
surrounded RESI's relationship with the State Department of Human 
Resources ("DHR"), RES I' s primary revenue source. DHR, which 
was entitled to compensation for any income generated by RESI using 
DHR equipment, was concerned with the accounting of its 
compensation. DHR complained that the accounting was both 
inconsistent and incomprehensible. After unsuccessfully trying to 
resolve its issues with RESI through Dr. Conte, the relationship 
between DHR and Dr. Conte deteriorated. The provost, John Haeger, 
was informed, and although the University was able to settle the 
problems with DHR, it became very dissatisfied with Dr. Conte and 
blamed him for the $2,300,000 reduction in DHR's contract the 
following year. 
After an internal investigation and a meeting to discuss RESI's 
activities and accounting problems, Dr. Conte was informed of the 
University's intent to fire him and their request that he resign. Dr. 
Conte subsequently refused to resign and was sent a letter from the 
University provost explaining that incompetence and willful neglect of 
duty were the causes of his termination. After a brief hearing before 
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the University president, Dr. Conte was formally terminated on 
January 26, 1999. 
Dr. Conte filed a complaint against the University in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County alleging, inter alia, that the 
University wrongfully discharged him and breached his employment 
contract. The trial judge refused the University's request to instruct 
the jury that if it found just cause to be required under the contract, the 
University was still permitted to fire Dr. Conte for "common law 
cause" or cause that goes to the "essence of the contract." The jury 
returned the verdict in favor of Dr. Conte, finding that the University 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause 
existed under the contract to fire Dr. Conte. 
The University appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
the University was required to show just cause for the termination and 
by refusing to instruct the jury on common law cause. The Court of 
Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Court of 
Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether a jury may examine or 
review the factual bases of an employer's decision to terminate an 
employee and whether Dr. Conte's employment contract was 
exclusive in its enumeration of the just cause for which Dr. Conte 
could be terminated. 
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the language of the 
employment contract. !d. at 78, 862 A.2d 946. Dr. Conte's 
employment contract contained a provision that set the time period of 
his employment and a provision that permitted termination only for 
cause. Id at 80, 862 A.2d at 948. Both provisions in the contract 
independently established that Dr. Conte was not an at-will employee. 
!d. 
The Court also noted that the language of the contract was 
ambiguous as to whether the fact-finding prerogative lay with the 
University. !d. The Court found, however, that no matter how the 
contract was interpreted, the University still retained the fact-finding 
prerogative. !d. at 82, 862 A.2d at 948-49. Even so, because the 
contract was ambiguous, the court decided to assume that Dr. Conte's 
interpretation of the contract was correct and that it did not specify 
who had the fact-finding prerogative. !d. at 82, 862 A.2d at 949. 
The Court next proceeded to distinguish just cause employment 
contracts, satisfaction employment contracts, and at- will employment 
contracts. !d. In at-will contracts, courts have held that "a jury cannot 
review any aspect of the employer's decision to terminate." !d. An 
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employer in an at-will contract may terminate an employee for any 
reason absent contravening public policy. Id. In a case involving a 
satisfaction employment contract, a jury cannot review the factual 
basis for an employer's termination, but it can review the employer's 
subjective motivation. Id. at 83, 862 A.2d at 950. The jury must 
determine whether the employer was truly dissatisfied with the 
employee's services or simply just feigning dissatisfaction.Jd. 
The Court of Appeals decided not to take the route of the lower 
courts in permitting the jury to review the factual basis for the 
employer's termination decision, but rather to review the objective 
motivation of the employer to ensure that they acted in good faith. I d. 
at 85, 862 A.2d at 950. The jury must determine whether the employer 
acted "reasonably" and make sure that its decision did not result from 
any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason. Id. 
Next, the Court compared this case to two analogous cases. In 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 
N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court held that it is the 
trier of fact, not the employer, that determines whether there was 
sufficient cause to warrant the employees termination. Towson 
University, 384 Md. at 86, 862 A.2d at 951. That court found that if 
the employer were the final arbiter of the discharge, then its promise to 
discharge only for just cause would be meaningless. Id. 
In Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Ore. 96, 643 P.2d 
1276 (1982), however, the court held that when an employer contracts 
to discharge only for just cause it does not forfeit its right to be the 
ultimate fact-finder in determining whether just cause existed. Towson 
University, 384 Md. at 86, 862 A.2d at 951. The employer only need 
prove to the jury that the misconduct occurred by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Id. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the court in Simpson that an 
employer does not contract away his right to be the ultimate fact- finder 
with regard to an employee's workplace performance. Id. at 87, 862 
A.2d at 952. The court reversed the holding of the Court of Special 
Appeals and decided not to interpret Dr. Conte's employment contract 
as granting the jury the authority to decide the factual bases for his 
termination. Id. Overall, the court found that, "if an employee is 
required to have in hand a signed confession or an eyewitness account 
of the alleged misconduct before it can act. .. effective decision making 
[would] be thwarted." Id. at 88, 862 A.2d at 953. In this case, the 
University alone was in the best position to determine if there were 
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sufficient facts present to indicate incompetence and willful neglect of 
duties. !d. at 89, 862 A.2d at 953. 
In this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland effectively 
limits the number of these disputes that will be placed on its docket. 
Employees in these cases will be more likely to accept the decision of 
their employer after exhausting the remedies set forth in their 
contracts. To bring these cases to court, employees must have proof 
that their termination was not reasonable or was arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal. 
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